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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa has received its own data protection legislation - the Protection of Personal 
Information (POPI) Act - in November 2013 and is expecting the government to appoint an 
Information Regulator to enforce the letter of the law. Until then, South African businesses will 
have time to get their house in order, but uncertainty exists as to how businesses will be affected 
when this happens. It is anticipated that the enforcement activities by the Information Regulator 
will be similar to how it is done by the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) in the United 
Kingdom. The ICO has been enforcing compliance with the Data Protection Act (DPA) of the 
United Kingdom since it obtained its enforcement powers in April 2010. This article summarises 
all actions taken by the ICO from April 2010 until the end of December 2013 to determine the 
industries most affected, the contraventions with the highest frequency and, where applicable, the 
highest monetary fines.  
 
This article should provide some insight into what South African businesses can expect after the 
Information Regulator is appointed and starts to enforce the law. It will also enable them to focus 
their attention on the safeguarding of business areas with increased data protection risks as well 
as provide some counter measures that can be taken to prevent punishable contraventions.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he first privacy legislations were enacted in the early 1970’s. The Data Protection Act of the West 
German Land of Hesse became law in 1970 and the Data Act of Sweden in 1973 (Clarke, 1989). 
Privacy legislation originally stemmed from the combined use of technology with information. The 
automated replication abilities of technology, like photocopying, microfilm and telecommunications, introduced the 
initial concerns about inappropriate or biased information practices (Clarke, 1989). Since the early 1970’s, new 
technologies have been advancing at a rapid pace and, according to Greenleaf (2013b), 99 countries had enacted 
privacy laws and 21 countries had privacy bills by June 2013. This indicates a clear global trend in the adoption of 
privacy legislation (Greenleaf, 2013c:1).   
 
Following this global trend, South Africa (SA) enacted its own privacy legislation - the Protection of 
Personal Information (POPI) Act on the 26
th
 of November 2013 (POPI, 2013). The act protects the privacy rights 
determined by section 14 of the South African Constitution that specifies that “everyone has the right to privacy”. 
The POPI Act will impact all responsible parties that collect, store, process and / or disseminate personal 
information as part of their business activities. A responsible party is defined by the POPI Act as “a public or private 
body or any other person which, alone or in conjunction with others, determines the purpose of and means for 
processing personal information”. The act allows for certain exclusions which includes the processing of 
information in one’s personal capacity, information that has been de-identified using anonymisation techniques 
(ICO, 2012e) or information that has been collected on behalf of a public body that promotes national security and 
public safety (POPI, 2013). 
 
 
T 
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The POPI Act was based on a thorough investigation of global privacy laws by the South African Law 
Reform Commission (SALRC) that based the principles of the act mainly on those implemented by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU) (Heyink, 2011, p.2). SALRC 
recommended that, similar to the approach adopted by the EU, a body should be established to enforce, monitor and 
promote the adherence of the data protection act implemented (Heyink, 2011, p.8). As a result, the POPI Act 
prescribes that an Information Regulator must be appointed by the government to ensure the enforcement and 
promotion of the rights protected by it (POPI, 2013, p.17). In the United Kingdom (UK), the Information 
Commissioner is currently entrusted with the enforcement responsibilities in terms of the Data Protection Act 
(DPA). The effect of the POPI Act on South African companies remains to be seen, but because the legislation and 
method of enforcement is based on similar principles adopted by the DPA (De Stadler, 2013), it can be argued that 
South African entities can look towards the UK to predict what the impact of the POPI Act will be on South African 
entities (Tubbs, 2014). 
  
According to Berry (2014, p.41), the new legislation will significantly impact the methods companies’ use 
to gather, save, utilise and distribute personal information as specific requirements of the POPI Act will have to be 
complied with. A study was done by IQ Business, in conjunction with the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, to test the South African companies’ readiness for the new act. They found that company attitudes and 
procedures towards protecting the privacy of personal data needed attention and indicated that a lot of work still had 
to be done by these companies to become compliant with the letter of the law (IQ Business, 2014). They predict that, 
in addition to the civil and criminal actions that could be taken against non-complaint companies, the impact of 
possible reputational damage could be even more severe, and possibly detrimental, for a company’s future (IQ 
Business, 2014, p.37). They also explored a possible advantage for companies to ensure compliance as it promotes 
the transparency in terms of what, how and where personal information is stored within companies (IQ Business, 
2014, p.37).    
 
The POPI Act includes data protection requirements that are similar to the DPA as well as guidelines in 
terms of appropriate direct marketing techniques (POPI, 2013) and adherence to it will be monitored and enforced 
by the Information Regulator. The UK has separate regulations - the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Regulations (PECR) - which prescribes acceptable direct marketing techniques (PECR, 2003) and the enforcement 
thereof also rests within the powers of the ICO. Contraventions, in terms of PECR, have been included in this study 
because the content of the POPI Act represents the content of the combination of the DPA and PECR.  
  
This study summarises the enforcement actions taken by the ICO in the UK to ascertain what contravening 
actions occurred most frequent and what industries were affected the most by the enforcement of the DPA and 
PECR by the ICO. This study attempts to use the results obtained by it to identify industries with higher data 
protection risks and to determine what contraventions led to the relevant enforcement actions taken by the ICO. The 
study also considers if the contraventions identified could have been avoided by the implementation of 
precautionary measures. 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
POPI has been promulgated on the 26
th
 of November 2013 and South African businesses have time to 
implement processes and procedures internally to ensure that they comply with the requirements of the act. The 
businesses also need to minimise the risk of contravention of any stipulations of the act before the Information 
Regulator is appointed and receives its enforcement powers (POPI, 2013). Section 40 of the POPI Act determines 
that an Information Regulator will be appointed by the government and that it will be responsible for the education 
of South African businesses and public regarding their responsibilities and rights regarding the protection of private 
information. The Information Regulator will also be responsible for the monitoring and enforcement of adherence to 
the act, the handling of complaints in terms of privacy violations, the conducting of research and the issuing of codes 
of conducts, where required, as well as the facilitation of cross border cooperation between different countries in 
terms of different privacy laws (POPI, 2013).  
 
According to sections 107 and 109 of the POPI act, it determines that the Information Regulator may 
impose a fine of up to R 10 million or imprisonment that does not exceed 10 years or a combination of a fine and 
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incarceration (POPI, 2013). The possible monetary fines and imprisonment with the additional prospect of 
reputational damage (IQ Business, 2014, p.37) pose a clear threat to South African businesses should they be found 
in breach of the requirements of the act. The purpose of this article is to identify the contravening actions that could 
be punishable by the Information Regulator as well as what industries are inherently exposed to higher levels of risk 
in terms of privacy and data protection.  The article also aims to provide business leaders and IT managers with 
possible precautionary steps that can be implemented to avoid data protection breaches in terms of the POPI Act. 
The basis for the conclusions reached in this study will be drawn from the summaries made of the different 
enforcement actions taken by the ICO on DPA and PECR breaches. The summaries indicate the monetary value and 
frequency of the contravening actions that were punished by the ICO as well as the industries affected by it.  
 
This article addresses the following research questions: 
 
 What similarities exist between the Data Protection Act and the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Regulations of the United Kingdom and the Protection of Personal Information Act of South Africa? 
 What contraventions led to the enforcement actions taken by the Information Commissioners Office? 
 Which industries were most affected by the enforcement actions taken by the Information Commissioners 
Office? 
 What precautionary measures could have been implemented against the occurrence of the high frequency 
contraventions?  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 A literature review was done to determine what personal data and information is referred to in the context 
of data protection legislation and also why it is important to protect it. A comparison between the POPI Act of SA 
and the DPA and PECR of the UK were also done to establish differences and similarities in the conditions and 
principles rooted in both acts. This was done to affirm why it is appropriate to use the outcomes in the UK to predict 
what can be expected in SA in terms of the enforcement of the POPI Act. The different enforcement types used in 
the UK are explained and the effects of possible reputational damage to companies are also discussed briefly. 
  
What Is Personal Data And Information? 
 
The POPI legislation defines personal data and information as any information that enables a user of the 
information to identify the data subject which could be a natural or juristic person (POPI, 2013, p.14). It includes 
information regarding race, marital status, health, gender, sex, pregnancy, ethnic origin, religion, disability, belief, 
etc. (POPI, 2013, p.14), as well as any identifying number or symbol, like an e-mail address, physical address, 
telephone number or online identifier.  
 
According to Greenleaf (2013a, p.236), the legal definition of personal data poses two restrictions on the 
scope of data privacy laws. Firstly, they do not extend to data that does not identify a person but allows for 
personalised interaction with a specific person. Examples of this would include the use of software to enable 
behavioural marketing where companies use software to construct personal profiles, which excludes names or online 
identifiers but allows the gathering of a significant amount of details about individuals (Schwartz & Solove, 2011, 
p.1818). In section one of the POPI Act, “online identifiers” are included in the “personal information” definitions 
and the ICO has provided guidelines on the use of cookies - a file downloaded from websites enabling a website to 
recognise specific devices - in the UK (ICO, 2012f) to assist in addressing this restriction.  
 
The second restriction is posed on the exclusion of data that is stored in a non-transitory form, like some 
forms of closed circuit television (CCTV) recordings (Greenleaf, 2013a, p.236). The ICO provides a CCTV code of 
practice (ICO, 2008) that includes guidance on how and where the recorded material must be stored in a responsible 
manner. The POPI Act does not address this concern directly (POPI, 2013), but the future Information Regulator 
will also be able to provide guidance to South African businesses about the preferred business practises to be 
employed regarding these types of material. 
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Importance Of Data Privacy Protection 
 
The exponential advances in technology are increasing the ability of organisations to accumulate, store, 
process and disseminate personal data (Greenleaf, 2013a, p.221). People use their computers and mobile phones 
nearly every day, inadvertently leaving comprehensive digital footprints behind. Our electronic devices are enabling 
enormous amounts of personal data to be moved via the internet between different jurisdictions without our 
knowledge (Greenleaf, 2013a, p.221), and electronic sensors, like CCTV cameras and other biometric identifiers, 
are being used extensively in our work and living environments (Greenleaf, 2013a, p.221). Data mining companies 
use special software to identify patterns in personal data obtained via various means and from various sources to 
predict people’s behaviour in the future based on their past actions (Greenleaf, 2013a, p.221). Cloud computing is 
being used more frequently by businesses to acquire advanced processing power and storage capacities at reduced 
costs as a result of the benefits of economies of scale (Basson, 2014, p.10). This exposes businesses to privacy risks 
if the hosting country’s legislation does not meet the minimum data privacy requirements prescribed by legislation 
of the responsible party’s country (Basson, 2014).  
 
The internet has made the international market very small with the transference of data, in most cases, 
being only a mouse click away. It is important to recognise that no prevailing organisations exist that govern data 
privacy over the internet globally (Greenleaf, 2013a, p.222). According to Greenleaf (2013a, p.222), “privacy” is a 
broader term than “data privacy” and includes the right to not being observed, the right to solitude, and the right to 
the protection of bodily integrity, but these meanings overlap because of ubiquitous data collection. Greenleaf 
(2013a, p.222) states that data privacy laws are the legal instrument that is the most capable of protecting privacy in 
this context, but it does not diminish other legislation that protects individual’s rights as well. The impact on privacy 
of these other legislations, e.g. consumer protection laws and constitutional rights, falls outside the scope of this 
article and will therefore not be explored further. 
 
According to Greenleaf (2013a, p.224-225), data privacy laws can only be effective if they include a 
comprehensive set of data privacy principles that agrees with international standards, like the OECD guidelines, and 
it must have a mandatory legal enforcement mechanism (Greenleaf, 2013a, p.224-225). It should also cover most of 
a country’s private and public sectors and not only be focused on a few subsectors, like “credit reporting” or 
“health” (Greenleaf, 2013a, p.225). Greenleaf (2013a, p.225) recommends that an independent “data protection 
authority” must be established to ensure the enforcement of the law, perform investigations of privacy complaints 
received and be involved with the improvement and amendments of privacy legislation.  
  
Comparisons Between The POPI Act Of SA And The DPA And PECR Of The UK 
 
The POPI Act and the DPA both use the term “data subject” when referring to the subject of the personal 
data or information (DPA, 1998; POPI, 2013). The enforcement body of the UK is called the Information 
Commissioner and the equivalent South African body that must still be appointed will be called the Information 
Regulator (DPA, 1998; POPI, 2013). The POPI Act uses the term “responsible party” when referring to the person 
or entity that “determines the purpose of and means for the processing of personal data and information” (POPI, 
2013) and the DPA refers to a “data controller”. Both acts define a separate subset of personal data referring to 
information that is deemed more sensitive in nature, like that which relates to a data subject’s racial or ethnic origin, 
political views, religious convictions and the membership of trade unions (DPA, 1998; POPI, 2013). Information 
about a data subject’s sexual preference and information about any criminal convictions are also deemed to fall 
within this sensitive data category (DPA, 1998; POPI, 2013). The term used in the POPI Act to describe this subset 
of personal information is “special personal information” and the term used by the DPA for the same subset of 
information is “sensitive personal information”.  In both the POPI Act and DPA, more stringent conditions for 
protection of data exist when a responsible party or data controller collects, uses, stores, disseminates or distributes 
data or information of this sensitive nature (DPA, 1998; POPI, 2013). 
  
The DPA requires data controllers to register as such with the ICO if they perform any pertinent data 
collection functions as part of their business activities (DPA, 1998) and the POPI Act does not have such a 
requirement (POPI, 2013) where responsible parties only process general personal data and the data subject has been 
adequately notified. According to section 57 of the POPI Act, prior approval must be obtained from the Information 
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Regulator under certain circumstances, which includes the linking of information of data subjects obtained by 
different sources, the processing of information on criminal behaviour, as well as information on credit reporting. 
Although not all responsible parties will be required to register with the Information Regulator, it is not expected 
that the enforcement of the act will be less effective as the embedded conditions of the POPI Act will still apply to 
all responsible parties. The enforcement of both the DPA and the POPI Act originates or will originate from the 
resolution of complaints received by the data protection agency from various organisations or members of the public 
(DPA, 1998; POPI, 2013).   
 
According to Greenleaf (2013a, p.237), the ten common core data privacy principles that should be 
included in privacy legislation so that it can be effective are: 1) fair data collection, 2) data quality, 3) purpose 
specification, 4) purpose notification when data are collected, 5) limitation to specified data uses, 6) reasonable 
security safeguards, 7) openness, 8) access and correction of an individual’s data, 9) accountability of the 
responsible parties, and 10) implementation or instruction of data export restrictions. These core principles are listed 
and described briefly in Table 1 with specific references to where these conditions are addressed in the relevant acts. 
 
The principle of “openness”, in terms of data practices, is included as a core data privacy principle by 
Greenleaf (2013a, p.237) but is not included in the principles of the DPA. Condition 6 of the POPI Act refers to the 
openness requirement but then defers the enforcement of this practice to the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act. Both SA and the UK have separate legislation that enforces this core principle and therefore falls outside the 
scope of this article. The respective acts that protect the “openness” principle are the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act in SA and the Freedom of Information Act in the UK and will not be explored further in this study.  
 
Table 1:  Comparison Of Core Data Privacy Principles Between The POPI Act And The DPA 
No. Core Principle POPI (RSA) DPA (UK) 
1 
Collection: Private data collection may only be done in ways that is fair, 
lawful and with the knowledge and consent of the data subject. 
Condition 2 Principle 1 
2 Data quality: Private data collected must be accurate and relevant. Condition 5 Principle 4 
3 
Purpose specification: Private data may only be collected for a specific use 
and the purpose must be specified at collection time.  
Condition 3 Principle 2 
4 
Purpose and rights notification: Data subjects must be notified that their data 
will be collected and for what purpose it will be used. 
Condition 3 Principle 2 
5 
Uses: The personal data may only be used or processed for the purposes that 
the data was originally collected, i.e. excessive processing is prohibited. 
Condition 4 
Principle 3  
Principle 5 
6 
Reasonable security safeguards: The necessary technical and procedural 
practices should be implemented to ensure the safety of the personal data. 
Condition 7 Principle 7 
7 
Individual’s access and correction: Data subjects have the right to know 
what information on them is stored and processed by the responsible party / 
data controller. The responsible party / data controller have a responsibility 
to affect any corrections if the data subjects inform them thereof. 
Condition 8 Section 7 
8 
Accountability: It is the obligation of the responsible party / data controller to 
implement and monitor adherence to the conditions of the act. 
Condition 1 Principle 6 
9 
Data export restrictions: Data transfers to countries may only be done to 
countries that have adequate data privacy legislations in place. 
Chapter 9, 
Section 72 
Principle 8 
(Adapted from DPA, 1998; Greenleaf, 2013a; POPI, 2013) 
 
 Nine out of the ten (90%) core principles, that should be incorporated in data privacy legislation to be 
effective (Greenleaf, 2013a), form part of the POPI Act and the DPA. It is apparent from Table 1 that the core 
principles on which both of the acts are based are significantly similar.  It could therefore be deduced that it is 
reasonable to expect the enforcement of both acts will lead to similar outcomes. This notion is supported by De 
Stadler (2013) and Tubbs (2014) and it is from this expectation that the summaries of all the enforcement actions 
taken by the ICO in the period under review were created.  
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 The PECR of the UK protects individuals’ rights in terms of unsolicited direct marketing techniques and 
the ICO has provided detailed guidance to businesses in terms of what is acceptable direct marketing behaviour 
(ICO, 2013c). This guidance document determines that direct marketing may only happen in the following 
instances: 
 
 Expressed permission should be obtained from the targeted people in the specific marketing campaigns. 
Records must be kept of where and how these permissions were obtained. 
 The direct marketing standard operating procedures should be tailored per marketing attempt as the consent 
obtained varies per marketing initiative, e.g. there are more stringent rules in terms of marketing calls than 
mail marketing. 
 Direct marketing via calls, texts or e-mails will probably not be valid if it is made to persons from details 
obtained from a third party. If a company wants to use data obtained from third parties, the data will have 
to undergo thorough testing to ensure that the correct permissions were obtained from the relevant data 
subjects before it can be used.  
 Marketing phone calls may only be made to data subjects that are not registered with the Telephone 
Preference Service (TPS) of the UK. No marketing calls may be done to data subjects that are registered 
with the TPS unless specific prior consent has been received by the specific data subject.  
 No recordings may be made of marketing calls without the prior consent of the data subject. 
 No marketing texts or emails may be sent to data subjects without expressed prior approval. Marketing to 
data subjects that are clients of the company may be allowed in certain circumstances. 
 Vendors must immediately stop direct marketing to any data subject that has indicated they want to “opt 
out”. 
 
 In chapter eight of the POPI Act, it states that no electronic direct marketing via text may be done to any 
data subjects without the expressed permission obtained to do so. Companies must provide data subjects the option 
to opt out of direct marketing drives and affect their request to exclude them from these drives immediately. 
Companies are allowed to market their products to clients if the products are similar to the products sold to them 
previously, but the data subject must be enabled to stop the receivables of such marketing at any time and with 
immediate effect.  
 
 In essence, the requirements of the POPI act corresponds with the requirements specified in the guidelines 
provided by the ICO listed above. It is therefore expected that transgressions in terms of the above guidelines would 
possibly also construe a punishable offence in South Africa. The membership of data subjects to the TPS is not dealt 
with in the POPI Act, although South African data subjects can currently register with the Direct Marketing 
Association of SA’s (DMASA) “Opt Out” database to stop unsolicited contact from vendors, but adherence to this 
initiative is voluntary and only required from DMASA members. The public will have to wait and see whether or 
not the Information Regulator determines that the DMASA’s “Opt Out” database will be used in the same fashion as 
in the UK by South African companies, but it is clear that unsolicited direct marketing will not be tolerated.  
 
Types Of Enforcement Actions 
 
 The ICO can impose monetary penalties, enforcement notices, judgements and prosecutions if a 
contravention of the DPA or the PECR was confirmed. The ICO has determined certain guidelines to indicate which 
contravention will fit into which type of action (ICO, n.d.-c) and the guidelines are briefly discussed below.  
 
Monetary Penalties 
 
 According to the Section 55A of the DPA, the ICO can impose a monetary penalty notice of up to £500 000 
if a serious contravention of the data protection principles has occurred that was likely to cause substantial damage 
or distress and the data controller knew or should have been aware of the risk and did not impose reasonable steps to 
prevent it. The ICO (2013e) provides guidance on how the monetary penalty should be calculated or determined and 
takes into consideration the seriousness of the offence, whether there were any mitigating or aggravating factors as 
well as the financial position of the data controller. The guidance provided by the ICO (2013e) stipulates that the 
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monetary penalties should be enforced in a consistent manner and it should be reasonable in terms of the violation 
that has occurred.  
 
 Sony Computer Entertainment Europe Limited was fined with a monetary penalty (ICO, 2013k) when the 
Sony PlayStation network platform came under attack via several distributed Denial of Service attacks and personal 
data stored on the platform was accessed by the attacker. The data accessed included customer names, email 
addresses, birth dates and passwords. Millions of customers also entered their encrypted credit card details, but there 
was no evidence that this information was accessed. The ICO found that the network platform did not meet the 
standards of new technical developments and as a result was inappropriate at the time of the attack. The ICO was 
satisfied that this breach was a serious offence and that a contravention of this sort could have caused substantial 
damage or distress and, as a result, decided on the significant fine of £250 00.  
 
Enforcement Notices 
 
 The ICO can also impose an enforcement notice that forces an organisation to stop or change their internal 
processes or actions so that they will not be acting in contravention with the DPA (ICO, 2014d). An example of this 
is where the ICO imposed an enforcement notice on Google Inc. (ICO, 2013f) to securely destroy all personal 
information collected without permission through their street view vehicles. The vehicles were used to collect data 
in the aim of improving their geographic location database, but they also collected data that included e-mail 
addresses, URLs and passwords from open Wi-Fi networks.  
 
Undertakings 
 
 Undertakings are issued by the ICO to organisations or persons that undertake to implement certain actions 
or processes to improve their compliance with the DPA (ICO, 2014g). Undertakings are signed by the ICO and the 
contravening organisation or person which then concludes an agreement between the two parties that the suggested 
changes have been agreed upon by both parties. Google Inc. and the ICO undersigned an undertaking where Google 
Inc. (ICO, 2010a) undertook to provide their employees with training in terms of data privacy principles and security 
awareness. 
 
Prosecutions 
 
 The ICO can also prosecute criminal contraventions in terms of the DPA (ICO, 2014f). Prosecutions have 
been done for contraventions in terms of section 55 of the DPA which forbids the unlawful collection of personal 
data and section 17 of the DPA which requires data controllers to notify the ICO that they are data controllers. A 
former Barclays Bank employee was prosecuted and fined £3 360 after accessing customers’ account details 
illegally (ICO, 2013a). She acquired information regarding the number of children a customer had and passed the 
information on to a friend of her who was in a relationship with the said customer at the time.  
 
Enforcement Actions In Terms Of POPI 
 
 According to chapter 11 of the POPI Act, the Information Regulator will also be able to impose monetary 
fines to the maximum value of R10 mil each and enforcement notices (POPI 2013, p.92) to instruct companies to 
stop from continuing with inappropriate data practises. The Information Regulator will also be able to instruct 
businesses to take specified prescribed steps (POPI 2013, p.92) resembling the use of undertakings by the ICO. The 
risk for a criminal conviction by means of imprisonment in terms of the POPI Act cannot be measured in this study 
because the ICO does not have the power to impose imprisonment actions and, as a result, the possibility of 
enforceable imprisonment by the Information Regulator of SA falls outside the scope of this article. Despite the fact 
that the ICO does not have the right to send a convicted person to prison, a shortfall, according to the UK Justice 
Committee (2012) in the enforcement powers of the ICO, the enforcement rights and responsibilities of the ICO and 
the Information Regulator are similar. This supports the belief of De Stadler (2013) and Tubbs (2014) that SA can 
look to the UK to envisage how the Information Regulator will enforce its powers when the time comes. The 
Information Regulator will also have a right to publish decisions, findings and actions taken if it’s believed that it 
will be in the public’s interest to do so. 
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Reputational Damage 
 
 Additional to the enforcement actions and the associated potential monetary implication as discussed 
above, reputational damages (IQ Business, 2014; Tubbs, 2014) can also significantly impact businesses if a 
judgment of non-compliance in terms of the privacy legislation is published by the data protection authority. An 
example of a company that faced reputational damage in the UK, as a result of a major security breach, is Sony 
Computer Entertainment Europe Limited when they were found guilty for a security breach that compromised the 
Sony PlayStation Platform when it was hacked in April 2011. Magee (2011) found that 94% of the UK public 
believed that this breach was damaging to Sony’s reputation and it contributed to 77% of consumers being more 
cautious in providing their personal information on the internet. 
 
 The risk of reputational damage cannot be quantified, but it is expected that it could lead to a loss of future 
business and clients. International business opportunities can also be jeopardised if it is believed that the data 
security principles applied within a specific business are inadequate.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
 The literature confirms the importance of protecting businesses from the possibility of non-compliance with 
data protection legislation. Enforcement actions by data protection authorities can lead to significant monetary 
penalties, possible incarceration and also the potential of harmful and possible detrimental reputational damage. The 
literature confirms why South African companies can obtain valuable insights into possible data protection risk areas 
while they aim to protect the private information that they are responsible for. Summaries were made of all the 
enforcement actions taken by the ICO from the time when the ICO obtained its mandate in April 2010 until the end 
of December 2013 in order to understand how the ICO enforced the law. The different types of enforcement actions 
that the ICO used to administer its powers were by imposing monetary penalties, undertakings, prosecutions - that 
excludes incarceration - and by the application of enforcement notices. 
 
Data Collection 
 
 The source data of the different summaries were collected from the ICO’s website. For the summaries of 
the monetary penalties (ICO, 2014e), undertakings (ICO, 2014g) and enforcement notices (ICO, 2014d), access to 
the electronic copies of the physical documents issued by the ICO were obtained. The prosecutions summary (ICO, 
2014f) was dependant on news reports as the ICO’s official documentation, in this regard, was not available on their 
website or on the internet. Data pertaining to the enforcement actions before 2012 had been removed on the ICO’s 
website at the beginning of 2014, but electronic copies were made by the researcher of all the documents used in the 
creation of the summaries and can be contacted if any queries arise. Most of this information can still be obtained 
from the Breach Watch website (ICO, 2014c) which provides information on UK regulatory breaches and activities. 
  
 Contraventions were classified per industry to identify if there are industries with higher data protection 
risks than others. The contraventions were also classified per contravening action to identify what the violations 
were with the highest frequency. 
  
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
 The study only looks at enforcements made by the ICO on contraventions of the UK DPA and PECR as 
these are the two acts that correspond with the implications of the POPI Act on South African entities. The 
ICO can also make judgements in terms of the UK Freedom of Information Act, Environmental 
Information Regulations and Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community 
Regulations (ICO, 2011g), but this falls outside the scope of this article and enforcement actions relating to 
these acts have been excluded in the summaries for the sake of this study. 
 Where an entity performed duties that overlapped with more than one industry, a decision was made on 
what the entity’s main industry was, and only that industry was listed in the summary. There were minimal 
instances where this was done and it is not expected that the alternative selection would have a significant 
impact on the outcome of the study.  
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 The completeness of the summaries is dependent on the data availability in the public domain, the ICO’s 
website and on the internet. If the ICO chose not to disclose or publish any actions taken by them, those 
actions would not have been included in the summaries. This could negatively impact the completeness of 
the data used to create the summaries presented in this study, but it is believed that the ICO would have 
published all the enforcement actions taken by them as it is their policy (Fox, Gorrill, Webb & Parker, 
2010, p.3) to publish enforcement actions to enhance their reputation as “the authoritative arbiter of 
information rights, an educator and an influencer”.  
 
EMPERICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Enforcement Profile 
 
Objective Of The Analysis 
 
 The total enforcements made by the ICO since April 2010 was summarised per enforcement type and per 
year and is presented in Table 2. The objective of this part of the analysis is to identify which enforcement type was 
used most frequently. 
 
Findings And Deductions 
 
Table 2:  Number Of Enforcement Actions Implemented By The ICO For The Period April 2010 To 31 December 2013 
Enforcement Type 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % 
Monetary Penalty 2 7 25 18 52 23.64 
Enforcement Notices 0 1 4 6 11 5.00 
Undertakings 0 71 31 28 130 59.09 
Prosecutions 0 10 9 8 27 12.27 
     
220 100 
 
 The most frequent action taken by the ICO was by means of agreed undertakings (59%) and imposed 
monetary penalties (24%). The frequency of the undertakings declined, while the imposed monetary penalties 
increased over the years under review, with 2012 having the highest number of issued monetary penalties to date. 
The reason for the initial high amount of undertakings in 2011 (71) and the gradual decline is due to the fact that the 
ICO started their enforcement regime by using undertakings as a precursor to more formal or harsh action in an 
attempt to motivate organisations to become compliant with the DPA (ICO, 2011g).  
 
Monetary Penalties By Contravention 
 
Objective Of The Analysis 
 
 The monetary penalties were summarised and the total, average, maximum, minimum amounts, as well as 
the number of violations per contravening action, are displayed in Table 3. The summary is sorted in descending 
order, with the highest average monetary penalty at the top. 
 
Findings And Deductions 
 
 All the monetary penalties were issued in terms of sensitive personal information breaches, except for one 
that occurred in 2013 where a bank sent multiple faxes containing personal information - that was not deemed 
sensitive - to wrong recipients. The bank received a monetary penalty of £75 000 and it is included in the results of 
Table 3 under contravention nr 15: “Private information faxed to wrong recipient/s”.  
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Table 3:  Monetary Penalties Per Contravening Action 
Nr Contravening Action Ave (£) Total (£) Max (£) Min (£) Number 
1 
Insecure disposal of hard drives containing personal 
data led to disclosure of sensitive personal 
information. 
262 500 525 000 325 000 200 000 2 
2 
Sensitive personal information compromised due to 
attack on network. Controls implemented by data 
controller found to be inadequate. 
250 000 250 000 250 000 250 000 1 
3 
Insecure storage of sensitive private information on 
paper records. 
225 000 225 000 225 000 225 000 1 
4 
Direct marketing: Sending of unsolicited text 
messages 
205 000 615 000 300 000 140 000 3 
5 
Insecure disposal of paper records containing 
sensitive personal information. 
175 000 350 000 250 000 100 000 2 
6 Sensitive personal data exposed in error on website. 175 000 175 000 175 000 175 000 1 
7 Unencrypted back-up tapes lost. 150 000 150 000 150 000 150 000 1 
8 Unencrypted DVD lost. 150 000 150 000 150 000 150 000 1 
9 Unencrypted USB's stolen/lost. 115 000 230 000 150 000 80 000 2 
10 
Sensitive private information e-mailed to wrong 
recipient/s. 
95 714 670 000 140 000 60 000 7 
11 Unencrypted laptop/s stolen. 90 000 360 000 150 000 60 000 4 
12 Direct marketing: Making unsolicited phone calls. 90 000 360 000 125 000 45 000 4 
13 
Hard copy of sensitive private information was 
provided/disclosed/sent to wrong recipient/s. 
86 500 865 000 140 000 50 000 10 
14 
Sensitive private information unknowingly loaded 
onto internet. 
85 000 170 000 100 000 70 000 2 
15 Private information faxed to wrong recipient/s. 80 000 320 000 100 000 55 000 4 
16 
Hard copy of sensitive private information was lost / 
stolen. 
77 500 310 000 100 000 70 000 4 
17 
Hard copy of sensitive private information was lost 
and leaked to media. 
70 000 70 000 70 000 70 000 1 
18 Unencrypted hard drive stolen. 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 1 
19 
Sensitive personal data exposed due to inadequate 
web hosting security. 
1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 
 TOTALS 111 558 5 801 000 325 000 1 000 52 
 
 The four contravening actions that had an average monetary penalty in excess of £200 000 were the 
insecure disposal of hard drives, inadequate network security, inadequate control over the storage of paper records, 
as well as the sending of unsolicited text messages. There were two incidents relating to the insecure disposal of 
hard drives which led to the highest average (£262 500) and maximum (£325 000) monetary penalty being awarded, 
although this contravention could have been completely avoided (ICO, 2012c, ICO, 2012j, ICO, 2013j). Companies 
that need to replace old electronic equipment, especially that which stores personal data, must follow reasonable 
steps to ensure proper removal and/or deletion of personal data stored on the devices. When the disposal of 
electronic equipment is proposed within a company, the ICO’s guidance document called “IT asset disposal for 
organisations” (ICO, 2012j) can be consulted.  
 
 One privacy breach occurred due to inadequate network security and led to a penalty of £250 000 (ICO, 
2013k) and, according to the ICO, this breach could have been avoided if the company installed up-to-date software 
(ICO, 2013l). One fine was also issued for the insecure storage of paper records and led to a monetary penalty of 
£225 000 being issued (ICO, 2012b). This fine could have been prevented if proper physical access controls were 
implemented to safeguard the documents against unauthorised access. Three monetary penalties were awarded 
towards inappropriate direct marketing techniques used in the form of unsolicited text messages, with the average 
penalty being £205 000 and the maximum penalty being £300 000. There were also four monetary penalties issued 
in terms of unsolicited marketing phone calls, with an average monetary penalty of £90 000 and a maximum penalty 
of £125 000. These fines could have been avoided if the contravening companies adhered to the ICO guidelines 
(ICO, 2013c) on direct marketing which clearly states that no marketing may be directed at anyone without 
obtaining specific consent from them and also not to people who registered themselves at the TPS.  
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 The only other contravention with a maximum penalty exceeding £200 000 was where paper records were 
insecurely disposed of (ICO, 2012m). The company received a penalty of £250 000 for discarding documents 
containing sensitive personal information at a paper recycling bank (ICO, 2012m) instead of shredding the 
documents and disposing of them securely. Another penalty that would have been close to the value of £200 000 
was where personal data were exposed online due to incorrect web hosting security, but the penalty was reduced to 
£1 000 because the data controller was not trading at the time when the fine was issued (ICO, 2011f). In this 
instance, the offender did not consult an IT professional when the business IT system was created and a web-hosting 
service - which was intended for domestic use - was implemented that led to the compromise of sensitive personal 
information of about 6,000 data subjects (ICO, 2011f). 
 
 The contraventions that happened most frequently were the disclosure of sensitive personal information via 
paper documents (10 instances) with sensitive private information being e-mailed to incorrect recipients occurring 
seven times. Proper employee training and the implementation of appropriate internal processes could have 
mitigated or even have prevented these contraventions (ICO, 2012k, ICO 2013i).  
 
Monetary Penalties By Industry 
 
Objective Of The Analysis 
 
 A summary was made of the total, average, maximum, minimum amounts and the number of 
contraventions per industry to identify the industry that was most affected by the monetary penalties imposed.  The 
summary is sorted in descending order, with the highest average monetary penalty at the top and can be found in 
Table 4. 
 
Findings And Deductions 
 
 All the monetary penalties issued were in terms of sensitive personal information breaches except for one 
contravention which was made in 2013 by a bank that sent multiple faxes containing non-sensitive personal 
information to the wrong recipients. The bank received a penalty of £75 000 which is included in Table 4 under 
industry nr 10 - “Financial Services”.  
 
Table 4:  Monetary Penalties Per Industry 
Nr Industry Ave (£) Total (£) Max (£) Min (£) Number 
1 Technology - Entertainment 250 000 250 000 250 000 250 000 1 
2 Marketing 220 000 440 000 300 000 140 000 2 
3 Health 145 000 1 450 000 325 000 55 000 10 
4 Justice 140 000 140 000 140 000 140 000 1 
5 Unspecified / Various Council Services 123 333 740 000 250 000 70 000 6 
6 Police 100 000 300 000 150 000 70 000 3 
7 Manufacturing 90 000 90 000 90 000 90 000 1 
8 Social services 89 706 1 525 000 140 000 60 000 17 
9 Energy Services 85 000 170 000 125 000 45 000 2 
10 Financial Services 92 500 555 000 175 000 5 000 6 
11 Education 70 000 140 000 80 000 60 000 2 
12 Legal Services 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 
 
TOTALS 111 558 5 801 000 325 000 1 000 52 
 
 The four industries that had average penalties exceeding £140 000 were technology (£250 000), marketing 
(£220 000), health (£145 000) and justice (£140 000). The four industries that had a maximum penalty that exceeded 
£200 000 were health services (£325 000), marketing (£300 000), technology (£250 000) and unspecified council 
services (£250 000). It should be noted that the contraventions in the marketing industry were both for inappropriate 
direct marketing techniques (calls and text messages) and also that the penalty for legal services was suggested to be 
£200 000 but was reduced because the business was not operating at the time the penalty was awarded (ICO, 2011f).  
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – November/December 2014 Volume 13, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1326 The Clute Institute 
 The three industries that had incident rates exceeding 10 incidents per industry and represents 64% of the 
total monetary penalties issued were social services (17 incidents), health services (10 incidents), and unspecified 
council services (6 incidents). All of these services are provided by the local government of the UK (ICO, 2014b). 
Health and social services manage high levels of sensitive personal information and could attribute to the fact that 
these services attract a higher data protection risk and possibly harsher penalties, like monetary fines. Financial 
services had an incident rate of 6, which is the same as for unspecified council services. 
 
Monetary Penalties Per Year 
 
Objective Of The Analysis 
 
 A summary of the total, average, maximum and minimum amounts of penalties per year was made to 
identify if there was any trend over the years in terms of the monetary penalties issued. 
 
Findings And Deductions 
 
 The monetary penalties issued by the ICO in terms of DPA and PECR for the period April 2010 to 
December 2013 are summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5:  Monetary Penalties Per Year For The Period April 2010 To December 2013 
Description 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Penalties in £ 160 000 541 000 3 120 000 1 980 000 5 801 000 
Penalties in % 2.76% 9.33% 53.78% 34.13% 100.00 
Average in £ 80 000 77 286 124 800 110 000 111 558 
Maximum in £ 100 000 130 000 325 000 250 000 325 000 
Minimum in £ 60 000 1 000 50 000 5 000 1 000 
 
 The total amount of penalties imposed by the ICO for the period April 2010 to December 2013 is 
£5 801 000, with more than half of the monetary value being imposed in 2012 (54%, £3 120 000) and 34% 
(£1 980 000) being imposed in 2013.  The significant increase in 2012 can be ascribed to the fact that the ICO has 
increased the use of monetary penalties to enforce compliance with legislation (ICO 2012h, p.30; ICO, 2013h, p.32). 
The decrease in 2013 could not be confirmed with a published strategic change by the ICO but could be ascribed to 
an increased awareness of data protection principles in UK organisations due to the continuous efforts of the ICO to 
communicate and publish the enforcement actions imposed since April 2010. The ICO does this to enhance 
businesses and the public’s awareness of their data protection and privacy rights and obligations. This trend can be 
revisited in future studies to see if the monetary penalties enforced continue to decline in future years. The average 
(£124 800) and maximum (£325 000) penalties for 2012 is the highest since 2010 and is followed by the second 
highest average (£110 000) and maximum (£250 000) penalties in 2013.   
 
Undertakings By Contravention 
 
Objective Of The Analysis 
 
 A summary was made of the number of undertakings issued by the ICO in terms of the DPA and PECR 
since April 2010. The undertakings were divided into contraventions of personal information breaches and also 
where this personal information was deemed “sensitive”. The summary can be found in Table 6 and is sorted with 
the contravening actions with the highest frequency at the top in descending order. 
 
Findings And Deductions 
 
 Undertakings issued by the ICO is an agreement between the ICO and the entity where the entity commits 
to making specific improvements in their organisation to ensure adherence to DPA and PECR or to allow the ICO to 
conduct an audit (ICO 2011g, p.40). The ICO has most frequently made use of undertakings (refer Table 1) to 
ensure and implement compliance in terms of the DPA and PECR. Although undertakings do not have a financial 
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impact, the ICO publishes these undertakings (Fox et al., 2010) on their website and could lead to causal 
reputational damages. Undertakings could therefore be seen as a lighter (ICO 2012h) form of enforcement but 
should not be ignored because of the possible resultant reputational damage (Cetinkaya, 2013, p.7; ICO, 2014a).  
 
 A total number of 130 (refer Table 1) undertakings was issued by the ICO in the period under review, but 
some of them addressed more than one contravening action. Instances were identified where one undertaking was 
issued for more than one contravening action and it was included separately in the following summaries (Tables 6 
and 7). This is the reason for the discrepancy between the number of undertakings in Table 1 (130) and Table 6 
(144). The number of occurrences per contravening action, as well as the ratio of non-sensitive personal information 
versus sensitive personal information breaches, is shown. The follow-up undertakings are also indicated separately 
(refer Table 6) but were only implemented from 2013 (ICO, 2013h, p.34) to ensure that the improvements, agreed 
upon previously by means of an undertaking, have been implemented. 
 
Table 6:  Undertakings Per Contravening Action 
Nr Contravening Action Number Sensitive Not Sensitive Follow Up 
1 Hard copy of private information was lost / stolen. 33 25 8 0 
2 Unencrypted computer drive / laptop/s stolen. 21 14 7 0 
3 
Hard copy of private information was 
provided/disclosed/sent to wrong or unauthorised 
recipient/s. 
13 10 3 0 
4 Private information e-mailed to wrong recipient/s. 13 10 3 0 
5 Unencrypted USB's stolen/lost. 11 7 4 0 
6 
Insecure disposal of paper records containing personal 
information. 
6 6 0 0 
7 Private information faxed to wrong recipient/s. 6 5 1 0 
8 
Inadequate website security provides access to personal 
information. 
6 3 3 0 
9 Disclosing personal information on website/internet. 4 2 2 0 
10 
Inadequate policies regarding maintenance, processing 
and storage of personal information. 
3 2 1 0 
11 
Insecure disposal of hard drives / laptops containing 
personal data. 
2 1 1 0 
12 
Personal Information compromised due to attack on 
network. Controls implemented by data controller found 
to be inadequate. 
2 1 1 0 
13 
Sensitive private information unknowingly loaded onto 
internet. 
2 1 1 0 
14 Unencrypted CD / Back-up tapes lost. 2 1 1 0 
15 
Illegally obtaining personal information (without data 
subject’s approval). 
1 1 0 0 
16 
E-mail account hacked and personal information 
accessed due to inappropriate security measures and 
inadequate privacy policies. 
1 1 0 0 
17 
Hard copy of private information was discarded 
insecurely. 
1 1 0 0 
18 
Inadequate technical security and policies to safeguard 
data from unauthorised access within the organisation. 
1 1 0 0 
19 Insecure handling and storing of hard copy data. 1 1 0 0 
20 
Insecure website provides access to personal 
information. 
1 1 0 0 
21 Recorded information is inaccurate. 1 1 0 0 
22 Storing of excessive information. 1 1 0 0 
23 
Third party personal data disclosed in response to 
“subject access request”. 
1 1 0 0 
24 
Failure to provide information within 40 days after “data 
subject request” was received. 
1 0 1 0 
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(Table 6 continued) 
25 
Inadequate technical security and policies in terms of 
personal data collected with CCTV cameras as well as 
insecure distribution and storage. 
1 0 1 0 
26 
Sending text messages to individuals without checking 
whether they had given their consent to be contacted. 
1 0 1 0 
27 
Unauthorised transfer / disclosure of electronic personal 
information to a third party. 
1 0 1 0 
28 
Unencrypted USB drive that is used to store personal 
information issued and used by staff 
1 0 1 0 
29 Follow up. 6 0 0 6 
 
Total 144 97 41 6 
 
 The contravening actions that exceeded 10 incidents were where paper records were lost or stolen (33 
incidents), the theft or loss of unencrypted laptops (21 incidents), paper records being sent/disclosed or provided to 
unauthorised/wrong person/s (13 incidents), private information sent to wrong e-mail addresses (13 incidents), and 
unencrypted USB drives that were lost or stolen (11 incidents). Of the total (144) undertakings enforced, 67% of the 
contraventions represent sensitive personal information breaches and 29% the breach of personal information that 
was not sensitive. Follow-up visits by the ICO represent 4% of the undertakings issued. 
 
 The loss of paper records includes instances where employees took paper records home to perform work 
with it after hours and the records were lost or stolen before they could be returned to the office the following day 
(ICO, 2011m; ICO, 2011q). It also includes paper records being misplaced or lost within offices (ICO, 2012i), 
records being lost during an office move due to inadequate record controls (ICO, 2011i), records being left in streets 
and in public places (ICO, 2011l), as well as the loss of records in archives (ICO, 2011c).  Most of the records lost in 
this way (75%) represent the breach of sensitive private information. Although the loss of paper records does not 
seem completely avoidable due to the inherent possibility of human error, the ICO provides guidance in the various 
undertakings to address and reduce the risks involved to acceptable levels (ICO, 2014g). 
 
 The unencrypted laptops (ICO, 2011d) and USB’s (ICO, 2011q) stolen or lost could have been avoided by 
ensuring that the devices were properly encrypted before they were used. It is important to note that access control 
via password does not imply a device is encrypted. The ICO advises that all portable and mobile devices that are 
used to send and store any form of personal information should be protected by using approved encryption software 
(ICO, 2012l). Encryption software uses embedded mathematical algorithms to encrypt and protect information and 
the software used should always be up to date and meet the required certification standards (ICO, 2012l). The 
majority of information compromised in this way (66%) was sensitive in nature. 
 
 Paper records provided/disclosed/sent to unauthorised/wrong persons includes instances where financial 
records were sent to the wrong recipients (ICO, 2011a) and where records of social workers were accidentally sent 
to wrong families (ICO, 2011o). It also includes the disclosure of excessive information in response to data access 
requests (ICO, 2013d), as well as paper records being sent to wrong recipients after printer mix-ups (ICO, 2012d) 
occurred. These contraventions could probably have been avoided if the relevant personnel were properly trained in 
terms of data protection principles and if they performed additional checks to ensure the correct information was 
sent to the right recipients. Another breach that could have been avoided occurred when an employee placed records 
containing sensitive personal information in her car in such a manner so that the information on the records was 
clearly visible to people passing the vehicle (ICO, 2011h). The ICO has provided clear instructions in the relevant 
undertakings on how the risks of data protection breaches should be reduced to an acceptable level (ICO, 2014g). 
The instructions include that staff that works with or has access to personal or sensitive personal information should 
have proper training on the importance, methods and policies implemented by the entity to ensure proper protection 
of all private information (ICO, 2014g). Most of the data compromised (77%) in this section represented sensitive 
personal information. 
 
 E-mails sent to wrong recipients includes those where users entered or used wrong e-mail addresses, as 
well as the selection of wrong e-mail addresses from the auto suggested e-mail address in the e-mail software, which 
inadvertently led to the sending of private information to unintended recipients (ICO, 2011e). It also included an 
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incident where a Microsoft Excel file, with hidden personal data included in Pivot Tables, was sent to a recipient in 
response to a data request (ICO, 2011p). In a similar incident, the information was sent in response to a freedom of 
information request, but the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that was used contained hidden columns which included 
personal information (ICO, 2012n). Another preventable breach of this nature occurred when an employee sent a pdf 
document containing the payslips of everyone employed in the specific company, to a previous employee in 
response to a payslip query (ICO, 2012g). The ICO provides guidance in the various undertakings to address or 
minimise the risk of exposing personal data by means of emails, and this includes staff training in the privacy policy 
of the company that could include the prohibition of the sending of private information via email (ICO 2011n ; ICO, 
2014g). The information exposed in this manner was mainly (77%) sensitive personal information. 
 
Undertakings Issued Per Industry 
 
Objective Of The Analysis 
 
 Table 7 is a summary of the number of undertakings per industry to identify which industries were affected 
the most. It is sorted in descending order with the industry that had the highest incident rate at the top. 
 
Findings And Deductions 
 
 The total undertakings summarised in Table 7 is 144. The reason for the discrepancy in the number of 
undertakings in Table 1 (130) with Table 7 (144) is explained in the above section. The follow-up undertakings are 
indicated separately.  
 
Table 7:  Undertakings Issued Per Industry 
Nr Industry Number Sensitive Not Sensitive Follow Up 
1 Health services 38 34 2 2 
2 Unspecified / Various Council Services 29 17 10 2 
3 Social services 17 17 0 0 
4 Education 15 8 7 0 
5 Charity 7 5 1 1 
6 Police 4 3 1 0 
7 Legal services 3 2 1 0 
8 Financial Services 3 1 2 0 
9 Estate and/or Letting Agents 3 0 3 0 
10 Court Services 2 2 0 0 
11 Recruitment services 2 2 0 0 
12 Recreational  services 2 1 1 0 
13 Food services 2 0 2 0 
14 Housing 2 0 2 0 
15 Union 2 1 0 1 
16 Technology - Knowledge management 1 1 0 0 
17 Chartered Institute 1 1 0 0 
18 Pharmaceutical 1 1 0 0 
19 Local Government Ombudsman 1 1 0 0 
20 State for the Home Department 1 0 1 0 
21 Technology - Online Monitoring Service 1 0 1 0 
22 Cosmetics 1 0 1 0 
23 Election services 1 0 1 0 
24 Technology - Information 1 0 1 0 
25 National Park 1 0 1 0 
26 Media 1 0 1 0 
27 Technology  1 0 1 0 
28 Political organisation 1 0 1 0 
 
Total 144 97 41 6 
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 The three industries that received the most and represents 58% of all the undertakings issued were health, 
council and social services, which all form part of the services provided by the UK local government. This high 
percentage rate corresponds with the findings in Table 4 where the same industries represented 65% of the total 
monetary value of penalties issued. From the above, it can be concluded that the health, council, and social services 
industries were affected most by the enforcement of the ICO’s powers. The monetary penalties (100%) and 
undertakings (81%) issued for these industries mainly reflected data breaches that involved sensitive personal 
information. It could therefore be argued that the high level of sensitive personal information inherently managed by 
these industries - health details, religious convictions, and mental well-being - could have attributed to a higher 
exposure to data protection risks. The risks linked to these industries could have been minimised through the 
adoption, implementation, and training of staff on the data protection and health guidelines of the ICO (ICO, 2010b; 
ICO, 2014n.d.-e).  
 
 The percentage of undertakings issued in the education industry was 10% and similar to the undertakings 
for the social services industry (12%) but in contrast with the findings in Table 4 which indicated that only two 
monetary penalties of £70 000 each were imposed for this industry. The value of the monetary penalties issued in 
the education industry represents only 2% of the total value of monetary penalties. The undertakings in education 
represented an almost equal divide in terms of sensitive personal information (53%) and non-sensitive personal 
information (47%). The main contravening actions incurred in the education industry were for the loss of 
unencrypted laptops and/or other storage mediums (60%) and the loss of physical documents (20%) containing 
personal information. The opposing low value and number of imposed monetary penalties suggests that this industry 
does not necessarily pose an increased risk to data protection breaches, although educational institutions should 
ensure proper encryption of storage media and training for all staff on data protection obligations faced by the 
institutions in order to prevent any unnecessary contraventions.  
 
Prosecutions Per Contravening Action And Industry Type 
 
Objective Of The Analysis 
 
 The average, maximum and minimum penalty amounts per prosecution were summarised in Table 8 per 
contravening action and in Table 9 per industry to ascertain which contravening action and industry had the highest 
monetary fine and highest incident rate for prosecutions in terms of the DPA. No prosecutions were made in terms 
of PECR. Both tables were summarised in descending order, with the highest average monetary fine at the top.   
 
Findings And Deductions 
 
 The only contraventions, in terms of the POPI Act, that could be expected to occur in SA (listed in Table 8) 
are where information was obtained and disclosed unlawfully as POPI does not require responsible parties to 
register as such with the Information Regulator. Contraventions in terms of section 17 of the DPA will therefore not 
apply to the South African context but is included in the summaries for the sake of completeness. 
  
Table 8:  Prosecutions Per Contravening Action 
Contravening Action 
Ave 
(£) 
Total 
(£) 
Max 
(£) 
Min 
(£) 
Nbr Sensitive 
Not 
Sensitive 
Not Applicable/ 
Unknown 
Unlawfully obtaining 
personal data 
(section 55). 
6 099 97 590 45 000 614 16 7 9 0 
Failure to notify ICO as 
data controller (section 
17). 
1 248 9 980 2 498 365 9 0 0 9 
Unlawfully disclosing 
personal information. 
420 420 420 420 1 0 1 0 
Failure to notify ICO that 
they are using CCTV 
cameras. 
365 365 365 365 1 0 1 0 
Total 4 168 108 355 45 000 365 27 7 11 9 
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 The average monetary fine for criminal offences is significantly lower £4 167 (0.037%) than the monetary 
penalties (£111 558) imposed for civil actions (refer to Tables 3 and 4). The contraventions with the highest total 
value (£97 590) and incident rate (16 incidents) were for convictions where personal data were obtained illegally, 
which will also be punishable in SA. The respective penalties of £45 000 and £28 700 were imposed on two separate 
employees that stole personal data from a telecommunications company and then sold it to third parties (ICO, 
2011b) to be used for direct marketing purposes. These two penalties represent 90% of the total fines imposed 
through prosecutions and clearly represent an intentional act by the relevant culprits, which could have been 
avoided. The sensitive personal information breached in this section is insignificant (26%) compared to these types 
of breaches that led to monetary penalties (98%) and undertakings (67%). 
 
Table 9:  Prosecutions Per Industry 
Industry 
Ave 
 (£) 
Total 
 (£) 
Max 
 (£) 
Min 
 (£) 
No. Sensitive 
Not 
Sensitive 
Not Applicable 
/Unknown 
Telecommunications 36 850 73 700 45 000 28 700 2 0 2 0 
Gambling 2 531 2 531 2 531 2 530 1 0 1 0 
Direct marketing  2 498 4 995 2 498 2 497 2 0 0 2 
Financial Services  1 911 11 467 3 360 1 180 6 1 3 2 
Health Services  1 806 9 030 4 391 614 5 5 0 0 
Estate and/or Letting 
Agents 
731 5 847 1 056 365 8 1 3 4 
Police Service  420 420 420 420 1 0 1 0 
Restaurant and Bar 
Services  
365 365 365 365 1 0 1 0 
Private security Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 0 0 1 
Total 4 167 108 355 45 000 365 27 7 11 9 
 
 It was identified that the ICO prosecuted a private investigator in the 2011 Annual Report (ICO, 2011g), 
but no other details could be confirmed on the ICO’s website or from any other sources on the internet in this regard. 
It was decided to include the instance in the summary for the sake of completeness, even though the monetary value 
of the fine could not be confirmed. The industry that received the highest fines in this section was 
telecommunications, which was discussed in the above paragraph.  
 
 The industries that had the highest incident rate for information that was acquired unlawfully were health 
services (5 incidents), financial services (4 incidents), and estate and letting agents (4 incidents). The balance of the 
incidents, as indicated in Table 9 for the mentioned industries, was for not registering as a data controller with the 
ICO and will not be elaborated on further as this requirement is not prescribed by the POPI Act. Unlawfully 
obtaining personal information requires an intentional unlawful act and will always be a risk to the protection of 
private information when a person wilfully decides to act unlawfully.  
 
Enforcement Notices Per Contravening Action And Industry 
 
Objective Of The Analysis 
 
 A summary was made of all the enforcement notices issued to identify if there were any prevalent 
contravening actions or industries that were affected by it. The summaries can be obtained in Tables 10 and 11.  
 
Findings And Deductions 
 
 Only 11 enforcement notices were issued between April 2010 and December 2013 and 73% of them were 
issued in terms of sensitive personal information breaches. The number of enforcement notices is significantly lower 
than the number of undertakings (130) and monetary penalties (51) issued by the ICO.  
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Table 10:  Enforcement Notices By Contravening Action 
Contravening Action Number Sensitive Not Sensitive 
Unencrypted laptop/s stolen. 4 4 0 
Excessive data gathering by CCTV cameras and processing thereof. 2 1 1 
Hard copy of private information was provided to wrong recipient/s. 1 1 0 
Private information e-mailed to wrong recipient/s. 1 1 0 
Illegally obtaining personal information without data subject’s approval. 1 1 0 
Failure to provide information from data subject request within 40 days. 1 0 1 
Direct marketing: Making unsolicited phone calls. 1 0 1 
TOTAL 11 8 3 
 
 The only contravening actions that occurred more than once were the theft of unencrypted laptops and the 
excessive data gathering with CCTV cameras. The ICO instructed three police stations and one council office to 
ensure that all electronic storage devices are encrypted before it is used. The ICO also instructed another police 
station and a council office to stop collecting excessive data with CCTV cameras with immediate effect and to 
responsibly destroy all data collected by it.  
 
Table 11: Enforcement Notices By Industry 
Industry Number Sensitive Not Sensitive 
Police 4 3 1 
Social Services 2 2 0 
Unspecified / Various Council Services 2 1 1 
Transport 1 1 0 
Technology - Knowledge management 1 1 0 
Energy Service 1 0 1 
TOTAL 11 8 3 
 
 Four police stations had notices imposed on them of which three were instructed to implement the 
compulsory use of encryption software on secondary storage devices (ICO, 2013b) and one was instructed to stop 
the excessive data gathering via CCTV cameras (ICO, 2013g). The enforcement notices for the social services was 
for the vigorous and compulsory training in data protection after sensitive personal data were exposed by providing 
a record containing private information to a wrong recipient (ICO, 2011k); the other instance included the sending 
of an e-mail to an incorrect recipient (ICO, 2012p).  The council services received enforcement notices to instruct 
that data requested, in terms of a data subject request, is to be disclosed within 40 days after the request was received 
(ICO, 2012o) and that the unencrypted storage devices are to be encrypted in the future. An international technology 
company - Google Inc. - was also served with an enforcement notice to ensure that they destroy all data collected via 
their street view vehicles (ICO, 2013f). 
 
CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
 If the South African Information Regulator performs its duties in line with the ICO, as expected by 
De Stadler (2013) and Tubbs (2014), it can be anticipated that the Information Regulator might initially prefer to 
make use of a lighter form of correctional actions in an attempt to motivate and educate organisations to become 
compliant with the POPI Act. The ICO selected to start their enforcement regime by using undertakings as a 
precursor to the more harsh action of huge monetary penalties to encourage organisations to become compliant with 
the DPA (ICO, 2011g), and they have gradually started to shift their focus to more severe punishment. 
 
 From the previously discussed findings, it can be deduced that any industry that manages special or 
sensitive personal information, like the health and social services industries, are exposed to a greater risk of data 
protection breaches and will be required to implement more stringent protection processes in their standard 
operating procedures concerning data protection than industries that do not manage sensitive personal information 
(DPA, 1998; POPI, 2013). This is supported by the findings in Tables 4 and 7 which indicated the high incident 
rates in terms of data breaches in the health and social services industries. The enforcement of the POPI Act will be 
on a complaint-driven system, similar to that in the UK, and it can also be argued that data subjects will be more 
prone to complain about a breach in personal data that they deem sensitive in nature than personal data that is not.  
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 It was expected that all data breaches by UK businesses would be electronic in nature, but a number of the 
breaches constituted the compromise of physical paper copies of documents that contained personal information. 
Documents were misplaced or lost within an organisation and removed from the businesses for legitimate reasons, 
e.g. to perform work at home, but the documents were stolen or lost before they were returned to the office the 
following day. Physical documents were also lost during office moves and archival storage periods. If the 
Information Regulator follows in the ICO’s footprints, it can be expected that they will provide guidance documents 
to South African businesses to assist them in addressing possible risk areas like these. It can be argued that where 
human intervention is required in a process, the risk of a data protection breach cannot be completely removed due 
to the inherent fallibility that exists within all humans (Reason, 2000, p.2).  These inherent risks should, however, be 
addressed by the implementation of various appropriate steps and procedures to reduce the risk of human error to an 
acceptable or reasonable level. 
 
 The loss of unencrypted computers, USB’s, hard drives, cd’s, dvd’s, back-up tapes, etc. could have been 
completely avoided if the secondary electronic storage devices used were encrypted with approved encryption 
software. It was found that many data controllers and data subjects were under the impression that if a storage 
device requested a password from the user, it was in fact already encrypted or sufficiently protecting the personal 
data stored on it, but that was not the case. Specialised encryption software is something additional to the 
implementation of passwords on their own and the ICO provides guidance on encryption criteria to be followed by 
data controllers (ICO, 2012l) and could also be consulted by South African companies if they require assistance in 
this regard.  
 
 The monetary fines imposed for unsolicited marketing techniques were significant and completely 
avoidable. South African direct marketing companies will have to ensure that they act in terms of the requirements 
of the POPI Act to avoid similar fines.  
 
 Wilful criminal acts by individuals to steal, obtain, disclose, or compromise personal data - for any reasons 
- should be earnestly considered by companies that manage personal information. Personal data have become a 
commodity with monetary value, and money could be earned by selling the data to the highest bidder. People can 
misuse their position at a company or institution to illegally obtain information on someone that they would not have 
been able to do otherwise. Data can also be stolen from a previous workplace to enable a person to set up shop 
elsewhere and to use the previous employer’s contacts to canvas for new business. There are many reasons that 
might motivate employees to wilfully breach the data protection policies of a company and will therefore not 
completely be avoidable. The seriousness of the offence should be highlighted during staff training sessions on data 
protection to ensure that employees understand the significance of adherence to the company policies in this regard 
and to serve as a warning. Staff must understand that contraventions of this nature might lead to weighty penalties 
for the company, disciplinary actions for the offending employees; and, in severe cases, it could also lead to 
imprisonment. 
 
 It is clear that all South African businesses that manage personal information, albeit sensitive or not, must 
get their house in order to ensure compliance with the POPI Act. This will include the creation of data protection 
procedures and the training of all staff that has access to and/or maintains personal information, as a number of 
contraventions occurred due to a general unawareness of data protection principles and could have been avoided 
with appropriate and timely staff training. The ICO provides a number of guidance notes that could be consulted by 
South African companies for direction until the South African Information Regulator provides its own guidance 
documents. Some of the guidance documents issued by the ICO include guidance on data protection (ICO, 2010b), a 
code of practice for online personal information (ICO, 2011j), and a general guidance on IT security (ICO, 2012a), 
as well as specific guidance notes for a few different industries, e.g. charities (ICO, n.d.-a), police and justice (ICO, 
n.d.-i), education (ICO, n.d.-b), finance (ICO, n.d.-d), health (ICO, n.d.-e), local authority (ICO, n.d.-f), marketing 
(ICO, n.d.-g), MP’s and political parties (ICO, n.d.-h), as well as guidance to small businesses (ICO, n.d.-j). 
 
 From the study, it is confirmed that hefty monetary penalties and other enforcement actions will be issued 
by the South African Information Regulator if serious contraventions are proven. In addition, it will also be able to 
impose prison sentences to individuals who represent guilty responsible parties. The impact of negative publicity 
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generated by the Information Regulator for any confirmed contraventions, in terms of the POPI Act, on a company’s 
reputation should also be considered as it could be detrimental to the future existence of the company. 
 
 This article addresses the uncertainty that awaits the South African business environment about what can be 
expected when the Information Regulator is appointed by the government and the POPI Act is enforced. Several of 
the contraventions that occurred in the UK could have been avoided if the appropriate and necessary safeguarding 
procedures were implemented in the businesses. The ICO provides several resources that South African companies 
can use to assist them in getting their house in order on time. This article also found that this legislation will not only 
impact information stored electronically, but also information that which is stored on physical paper copies of 
documents. This article sheds some light on what could be expected in the unknown future for South Africa in terms 
of the enforcement of the POPI Act.  
 
 The Information Regulator can also use the information in the summaries from this study to form an 
understanding of how the ICO generally dealt with specific contravening actions and it could assist them in deciding 
how they should act in similar circumstances. This article refers to various guidance documents created by the ICO 
to assist the UK businesses in the implementation of processes to safeguard themselves against data protection 
violations. The Information Regulator can also use this article as guidance when deciding which documents they 
should create with urgency as part of their education and training responsibility to South African businesses and the 
public. 
 
 A possible area for further research includes a comparison of the actual enforcement actions taken by the 
Information Regulator in the future to the findings in this article and to explore any significant differences. Another 
area would be to identify specific data protection risks linked to different industries and to provide specific 
procedures to address the risks identified. An example of this could include the exploration of data protection 
practices used and risks linked to academic researchers who use or process personal information as part of their 
research actions. The underlying data of the summaries set out in this article, with the accompanying uniform 
resource locators to the different enforcement notices, can also be published so that it can be used by other 
researches if required.  
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